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We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of a model of political competition 
between two parties in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting entails differentiated trade policies, 
with a party proposing a high tariff, and the other one a low one. The basic departure 
from a median voter model is the introduction of campaign contributions, which 
influence the vote of a group of uninformed voters. Parties are Downsian, not 
ideological, yet campaign contributions create an asymmetry between them. Thus, the 
heterogeneous behavior of parties, protectionism and pro-trade, is endogenously 
decided, rather than a prior assumed in previous works.  
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I. Introduction 
Why is trade not free? Economists admit that political intervention is a key factor 
of trade policy. Many literatures make significant contributions on explaining the 
formation of tariffs. These include Feenstra-Bhagwati (1982), Mayer (1984), Hillman-
Heinrich Ursprung (1988), Magee-Brock-Young (1989), Grossman-Helpman (1994, 
1996) and etc. A complete survey can be also found from Hillman (1989). 
In previous work on political economy of trade, the heterogeneous behavior of 
parties, the protectionist and the pro-import party, is assumed as a prior. This paper, 
instead, presents a model where the parties’ differentiated tariff policies are 
endogenously determined modulo a postulated asymmetry in the voters’ perceptions 
of parties; by applying the Heckscher-Ohlin model in the median voter model. In 
words, when two parties compete for the office over trade policy, the two parties 
diverge from the median voter’s choice. One party chooses a high tariff while the 
other picks a low one at the Nash equilibrium. 
The median voter theorem claims that collective choice will follow the median 
voter’s preference given a continuum of voters. Downs (1957) argued that the median 
voter theorem holds when two parties compete over a uni-dimensional issue: given 
single-peaked utility functions of voters, each party announces the policy that is the 
favorite of the median voter in the unique Nash equilibrium. Since then, many papers 
seek to examine the validity of the median voter theorem from various aspects (e.g., 
Wittman, 1983, Baron, 1994, Roemer, 1994.).  
An adaptation of the Downsian model is used herein to describe the trade policy   3
equilibrium in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Section II describes an economy with 
two-factor and two-industry, followed by a brief introduction of the behavior of two 
Downsian parties in section III. Section IV is a benchmark model. Parties choose 
tariff to maximize their vote shares in the election. Section V considers a more 
realistic case. Two types of voters, informed and uninformed group, vote for their 
favorite party in the election. Both parties maximize their vote shares, collecting 
campaign contributions from the informed voters. The contributions are used to sway 
the uninformed voters. At the Nash equilibrium, the two parties announce the same 
tariff platform in the benchmark setting. However, in the more realistic case, parties 
choose different trade policy instead. In other words, the heterogeneous behaviors of 
parties are a result rather than an assumption in this paper. Section VI provides an 
example to explain the findings. A brief summary is presented in Section VII. 
II. The Economy 
   This is a two-by-two (2 factors and 2 sectors) Heckscher-Ohlin model.  A small 
country with relatively capital abundant endowments produce a capital-intensive 
commodity ( 1 x ) and a labor-intensive commodity ( 2 x ), using capital (K  ) and labor 
(L ). Voters (consumers) have identical, additively separable quasi-linear preferences. 
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The capital-intensive commodity, 
i x1 , is the numeraire good and serves as the 
consumption of voteri on an export good while the labor-intensive commodity, 
i x2, is 
the consumption of voter i on an import good. Throughout the model, the production   4
of the export good and the import good ,wage, rental, aggregate import and the given 
total endowments of labor and capital are denoted by  1 y , 2 y , L p m r w ), ( , ,a n d K  
respectively. The derivative of rate of return on capital and the derivative of aggregate 
import demand as  ) (p r′ and  ) (p m′ respectively. 
The sub-utility functions  ( )
i x u 2  are differentiable, increasing, strictly concave and 
identical across voters. To analyze the impact of import tariff, the price of the export 
good is normalized to unity. The budget constraint is of the following form:  
i i px x 2 1 + =
i E ,                                                           (2) 
where 
i E  is the total income while  p  denotes the domestic import good’s relative 
price. Also, the specific tariff (t) provides a wedge between domestic relative price 
and the world relative price ( p
w) so that
w p t p + = . To make the model tractable, 
other trade policy instruments such as voluntary export restraints (VERs) or quotas 
are ignored here. Solving this constrained optimization problem, the indirect utility 
function, ) , (
i i E p v , is of the following form: 
) ( ) , ( p CS E E p v
i i i + = ,                                                      (3) 
where = ) (p CS () ) (p d u ) (p pd −   is the consumer surplus derived from the 
consumption of these goods and  ) (p d  is the import demand function
 2.   
Following Mayer (1984), each voter is assumed to have the same labor endowment 
but different capital endowments (some are rich and some are poor).That is, the voter 
ihas 
i K units of capital and one unit of labor. Assuming the import tariff income (T ) 
                                                        










= . And then the import demand function  ) (p d  is an 
inverse function of price.   5
is redistributed with a lump sum subsidy for simplicity, the individual’s budget 
constraint is: 
i i px x 2 1 + = L T rK w
i + +  .                                           (4) 
Voteri’s indirect utility function can be written as: 
+ = ) ( ) ( p CS p v
i L p T K p r p w
i ) ( ) ( ) ( + ⋅ + .                                      (5) 
Herewand r are actually affected by the import price p  due to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem
3. The consumer surplus is the same for each voter since they 
utility functions are identical. The only difference among voters is their incomes, 
which include the return to the factors and tariff revenue. Both of these are a function 
of the tariff level. Hence, given a different level of import tariff, each voter has a 
different level of utility.  
III. The Political Parties 
Two political parties, Party A and Party B are Downsian, not ideological. Both 
parties choose their tariff platform to maximize their vote share in the election. Unlike 
previous works of considering ideology, the two parties here only care their 
probability of winning, precisely, their vote share in the election. Throughout the 
paper, both parties are assumed to credibly commit to their platforms.  
IV. The Benchmark Model 
A voter supports Party A if and only if his/her indirect utility at Party A’s tariff 
platform level is higher than that of Party B: 0 ) ( ) ( > −
B i A i p v p v .Otherwise, he/she 
will vote for Party B. In particular, using (5), the set of the voters that support Party 
                                                        
3 The import demand function is assumed to be a straight downward sloping line for simplicity. This 
assumption guarantees the existence of the single-peak property of the indirect utility functions.    6
A, A Ω , can be written as: 
A Ω ={ [] [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
B A B A i p w p w p CS p CS K − + −  
       [ ] [ ] } 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > − + − + L p T p T p r p r K
B A B A i .                (6) 
One trivial case is that both parties choose the same platform initially. In that case, 
two parties obtain the 50-50 vote share in the election since there is no difference 
between two parties. Let
B A p p ≠ , and assume, without loss of generality, 
that
B A p p > . With simple algebra, the set  A Ω can be written as:  
A Ω = { } ) , (
~ B A i p p K K i < , 
where the cutoff capital levelK
~
is obtained from (6):  
) ( ) (




B A B A B A
B A
p r p r
L p T p T p w p w p CS p CS
p p K
−
− + − + −
≡            (7). 
Similarly,  B Ω  denotes the set of the voters who support Party B: 
B Ω = { } ) , (
~ B A i p p K K i > . 
The intuition here is that voters are separated into two groups by parties’ platforms: 
rich and poor. Voters whose capital endowments are lower than the cut-off point vote 
for Party A in the election. 
The corresponding density function for voters is assumed to be ) (
i K f since voters 
are different only in their capital endowment level. The vote share for Party A 
therefore can be expressed as∫Ω A
i i dK K f ) ( . Denoting Party A’s vote share function as 
) , (
B A p p ϕ and the set of possible trade platform of Party A asP
4, Party A chooses its 
optimal platform, 
A p  in P  to maximize its vote share in the election: 
                                                        
4P is bounded so that each domestic import relative price must lie between some minimum p and 









p p K i i
P p
dK K f   .                                    (8) 
Throughout the paper, the equilibrium is restricted to locate in the interior of tariff 
platform. To obtain each party’s optimal tariff level, one can easily obtain the first 
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. With some calculation (see Appendix 1), one obtains: 
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p p K
.                            (9) 
The optimal tariff platform for Party A (
Ao t ) can be obtained by solving (9): 
L p m











=     .                                                  (10) 
Party A’s optimal tariff depends on three factors. First, the larger the difference 
between the mean of the aggregate capital-labor ratio and the cutoff point is, the 
higher the protection is. Secondly, the flatter the slope of the rate of returns on capital 
the higher the protection. Finally, the steeper the slope of the aggregate import 
demand curve is, the higher the protection is. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that the effects of imposing an import tariff 
on the labor-intensive good are a rise in wage and a fall in the return on capital: 
0 ) ( < ′ p r ; by the same token, ) ( ) (
A B p r p r − >0. The import demand function is also 
downward sloping, 0 ) ( < ′
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that
L p m




























< .  In other words, the optimal trade platform level in (10) 
is also the maximizer of vote share for Party A. 
Based on the symmetric setup of two parties, one can easily obtain the optimal 
platform level for Party B which is exactly identical to that of Party A (see Appendix 
2): 
L p m











=  .                                            (11) 
The single-peak property of parties’ vote share function suggests neither party will 
deviate from the median voter’s choice. Otherwise, a party will lose some of its vote 
share. For example, if Party A deviates a little from its optimal 
platform: 0 > = − ε
Ao A t t , then its vote share falls: ) , ( ) , (
Bo Ao Bo A t t t t ϕ ϕ < . Actually, 
one can easily find that (the proof is provided in Appendix 3): 
Ao A Bo Ao Bo A t t t t t t ≠ ∀ < ), , ( ) , ( ϕ ϕ                              (12A) 
                        and    
Bo B Bo Ao B Ao t t t t t t ≠ ∀ > ), , ( ) , ( ϕ ϕ .                            (12B) 
 (12A) and (12B) establish that the optimal trade platform pair  ) , (
Bo Ao t t is Nash 
equilibrium. There is no difference between the two parties’ optimal tariff at the Nash 
equilibrium. Also, given the setup of continuum individual voters in the model, there 
must exist a median voter, whose preferred trade policy (
median t ) is identical to both 
parties’ optimal platform as well:
median Bo Ao t t t = = .  
Hence, the two parties announce the same trade platform at the Nash equilibrium. 
Given no difference between the policies of two parties, the vote share of each will be   9
one-half. It is also no doubt that the cutoff capital level coincides with the median 
capital level.  
Proposition 1: at  the unique Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model,  both 
parties choose an identical trade platform level (
o t ),which is the median voter’s 
ideal tariff,  
L p m











V. The Model with Contribution Schedules 
 More realistically, let us consider two types of voters: informed and uninformed. 
Informed are as those in the benchmark model: their vote is determined by the 
platforms 
A t and 
B t   (hence, 
A p and
B p ) of the parties. The uninformed, on the 
contrary, vote for one party or the other one depending on the relative strength of the 
campaign contributions received by each party. A new datum in the model is the 
fraction ρ  of informed voters which is assumed to be given.   
It is understood that some citizens contribute to the parties’ campaign funds.  The 
intuition here is some voters have strong preference on a party before the election 
while some others do not. For example, blue-collar workers prefer a higher tariff on 
clothing, and (they or their unions) are willing to contribute to the party that 
proposes a high tariff. Informed voters make campaign contribution to a party while 
uninformed voters do not. Each party uses the campaign contribution it collects to 
advertise to the uninformed voters. Affected by the campaign mass media, eventually, 
uninformed voters choose a specific party on the Election Day.   10
  Campaign contributions are modeled as follows: the total amount of contributions 
to Party A is an increasing function ) (
A A p C of the tariff 
A t  proposed by Party A, 
whereas the total amount of contributions to Party B is a decreasing function 
) (
B B p C of the tariff 
B t  proposed by Party B. Intuitively, some voters like high 
tariffs and look at Party A as the one that will implement them: accordingly, they 
contribute to the party’s campaign amounts that are increasing in the tariff proposed 
by Party A. Conversely, other voters like low tariffs and look at Party B as the one 
that will implement them: contributing amounts that are decreasing in the tariff 
proposed by Party B.  
The vote share for a party includes two parts: informed and uninformed vote share. 
Similar to the benchmark setup, informed voters differ only in their capital 
endowment levels.   
Since the behavior of the informed voters is identical to the benchmark model. 
Assuming for the moment that
B A p p > , the fraction of the informed voters who 




0 ) ( ) , (
B A p p K i i B A dK K f p p ϕ [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ . 
The vote share from uninformed group for Party A depends on the campaign 
contribution that it collects. A micro-model of how uninformed voters decide to vote 
has not been presented in previous literatures. Following such literatures (Jacobson 
1987, Snyder 1989, Baron 1994 and Roemer 2001), a functional form, ) (
B A A C C C + , 
which describes the campaign contribution share, is used to characterize the behavior 
of uninformed voters in this paper: the more the contributions a party catches, the   11
more the vote that the party gets from uninformed group.   
Each party’s contribution schedule is also assumed to depend on some own 
exogenous “operating sunk cost” (Z ): besides the expenditure on the media, a party 
still needs to spend money on renting the office and hiring professional staff and etc. 
Since the organization ability of each party is different, both parties’ operating costs 
are assumed to be different:
B A Z Z ≠ .  
To make the model tractable, each party’s contribution schedule is assumed to 
depend on its own trade platform level
5. The main interest here is to check whether 
these two tariff-oriented parties have the heterogeneous behavior at the Nash 
equilibrium. In other words, if voters are divided into two groups, and informed group 
is allowed to make campaign contributions, will both parties still choose the same 
tariff in the equilibrium?  
At the Nash equilibrium, each party chooses its platform in order to maximize its 
vote share given the platform chosen by the other party. Assuming again
B A p p > , 
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A A p p K i i





⋅ − + ⋅∫ ρ ρ  .               (17) 
By the same token, Party B chooses its optimal trade platform to maximize its vote 
share as well: 
  ()
) ( ) (
) (
1 ) ( 1
) , (
~
0 B B A A
B B p p K i i
p p C p C
p C
dK K f Max
B A
B +
⋅ − +  

 
 − ⋅ ∫ Ρ ∈
ρ ρ .                  (18) 
  Observing (17), informed voters who support Party A are relatively labor abundant 
                                                        
5 An example is provided to explain this assumption in the next section.   12
and hence would prefer a higher import tariff by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
Hence, the higher the import tariff platform that Party A posts, the more the campaign 
contributions informed voters donate.  By the same token, since informed voters who 
support Party B are relatively capital abundant, the higher the import tariff Party B 
posts, the less the campaign contributions informed voters make instead. Based on 
this consideration, we have assumptions as follows: 
Assumptions:  
(1)  The marginal contribution schedule of Party A of its trade platform is positive 
and independent from Party B’s contribution schedule:   .  
(2)  The marginal contribution schedule of Party B of its trade platform is negative 















To solve for the Nash equilibrium, let us assume Party A deviates a little from
median t , 
say 0 > = − ε
median A t p   while still keep another party’s platform 
unchanged:
median B t p =  . The interest is to see whether both parties choose the same 
tariff in the equilibrium. 











) ( ) (
2



























ρ  .                       (19) 
Party A’s vote share function is not necessarily a concave function of its tariff 
platform. However, for tractability, let us restrict our attention to the concave case, 
which clearly is possible. Hence, (19) also implies: 
























.                                                           (20) 
With some similar calculations shown before, (20) can be written as: 
0
) ( ) (





′ + ′ −
A B
A A A
p r p r
L p m t p r L K K
. 
Given 0 > = − ε
B A p p , the denominator of the above expression is positive. It means 
the optimal tariff for Party A (
* A t ) has the following property:  
L p m










> .                                          (21) 
Compared with benchmark equilibrium condition (10), (21) indicates that now the 
optimal trade platform for Party A is larger than the trade platform that the median 
voter chooses (recall that
Ao median t t = ). Given the concavity of its vote share function, 
the vote share for Party A at point 
median t is smaller than that at the maximizer point
* A t ; 
otherwise, Party A does not want to deviate. 
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as well. With 
some calculation shown in Appendix 2, it turns out:   
0
) ( ) (





′ + ′ −
A B
B B
p r p r
L p m t p r K L K
 .                                      (23) 
Keeping Party A’s platform unchanged, Party B is assumed to decrease its tariff a 
little from the median voter’s preferred platform: 0 < = − ε
median B t t . In other words, 
A B p p < . The necessary condition of Party B’s optimal tariff platform (
* B t ) is:   14
L p m










< .                                                    (24) 
(24) means that the optimal trade platform for Party B is now lower than the trade 
platform that the median voter chooses (recall that
Bo median t t = ). In other words, At the 
Nash equilibrium, both parties’ optimal platforms are different. Party A prefers a high 
tariff while Party B prefers a low tariff. Figure 1 illustrates this finding. 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Proposition 2:  at the unique Nash equilibrium of the model with campaign 
contributions, the two parties choose different tariff levels:
B A p p > .  
 
Intuitively, the party which chooses a high tariff at the Nash equilibrium, Party A, 
is called “Protectionism Party”. Conversely, the party which picks a low tariff, Party 
B, is labeled as “Pro-trade Party”. In other words, the heterogeneous behavior of 
parties is a result rather than an assumption in this paper.  
Our last interest is both parties’ vote shares in the equilibrium. From (20), when 
Party A increases its trade platform a little from
median t , it loses some informed voters. 
Simultaneously, a raise of its trade platform also increases its vote share within the 
uninformed group (recall 0 > ∂ ∂
A A p C ). The change of total vote share depends on 
which effect is dominant. If the vote loss within informed voters dominates the vote 
gain within the uninformed voter, then Party A will get less than a half of vote and lost 
the election, vice versa. However, without more information about parties’ operating 
sunk costs, informed voters’ exact utility function and exact form of probability 
density function; one can not predict the election outcome.    15
 
VI. An Example of the Contribution Schedules 
   The main aim of this section is to provide an example to illustrate the assumptions 
posted in the previous section, using a widely accepted contribution schedule 
introduced by Grossman-Helpman (1994). Specifically, when the tariff is evaluated at 
median voter preferred level, the previous assumptions, 0 > ∂ ∂
A A p C , 0 < ∂ ∂
B B p C , 
0 = ∂ ∂
B A p C and  0 = ∂ ∂
A B p C , holds well mathematically.  
 Following Grossman-Helpman (1994), a party’s campaign contribution schedule 
depends on both its supporters’ welfare and its operating sunk cost. In particular, they 
use the following form: 
[ ]
A B A A B A A z p p W z p p C − = ) , ( , 0 max ) , , ( ,                                (25) 
where ) , (
B A p p W is the collective welfare of the informed voters who support Party A 
and 
A z is an exogenous parameter. Assuming the collective welfare is higher than the 




0 ) ( ) ( ) , , (
B A p p K A i i A i A B A A z dK K f p v z p p C .                      (26) 
Notice that each voter’s indirect utility in (26) is just a function of 
A p since all 
these voters vote for and contribute to Party A. After some calculation (see Appendix 
4), one gets: 
[] ∫ − + + + =
) , (
~
0 ) ( ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , (
B A p p K A i i A A A A A A B A A z dK K f p CS L p m t K p r p w z p p C . 
Starting from the median voter’s choice,
median t , Party A increases its platform 
A p  a 
little so that  0 > = − ε
median A t t while Party B still keeps its platform at the median 
voters ideal point, 
median B t t = .Taking the partial derivative with respect to
A t around   16
point 
median t , it turns out: 
median A
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) , (
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.       (27) 






median A t t
A p
K
 by (10). Hence, 
the sign of LHS just depends on the second term in the RHS. With some calculation 
(see Appendix 4), one has: 
0 ) ( )
~










i i i K
o
A i i K
o A
i
dK K f K K p r dK K f
p
v
4 3 42 1 3 2 1
 .                        (28) 
Recall ) (
A p r′  is negative by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Also, each voter’s 
capital endowment,
i K , is within the range ]
~
, 0 [ K . That is, ]
~
, 0 [ , 0
~
K K K K
i i ∈ ∀ < − . In 
other words, the LHS of (28) is positive. But this implies that LHS of (27) is positive 
too. Hence, Party A’s marginal contribution of its own trade platform is positive. The 
first assumption works well in this example. 
  A similar result for Party B is presented here: 
{






































) ( ) (
4 43 4 42 1
,    (29)  
where
max K  denotes the voter with maximum capital endowment. Note again that the 






median B t t
B p
K
; hence, the sign of the 
second term in the RHS determines the sign of LHS. With simple algebra, we have: 
0 ) ( )
~











i i i K
K
B i i K
K B
i
dK K f K K p r dK K f
p
v
4 3 42 1 3 2 1 . 
But this just implies that Party B’s marginal contribution of its own trade platform, the   17
LHS of (29), is negative. 
One can check that the contribution schedules of both parties do not have any 
















median B A t t t
B p
K
, we have: 
0
~
















K f p v
p
p p C
                           (30A) 
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~
















K f p v
p
p p C
.                         (30B) 
Thus far, the assumptions used before hold well using a widely accepted example. 
As a consequence, the previous theoretical findings are robust. 
VII. Conclusions 
  Previous trade works on political economy take the heterogeneous parties’ 
behaviors as given, by assuming a protectionist party and a pro-import party. The 
main contribution of this paper is to show that the heterogeneous parties’ behavior is 
endogenously informed, rather than exogenously given, by applying a Heckscher-
Ohlin model in a Downsian model.  
In a two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model with two parties, parties choose their 
optimal tariff to maximize their vote share from informed and uninformed voters. 
Informed voters, who have different capital endowment, make financial contributions 
to their preferred party. Such money is also used to sway the uninformed voters. 
Under this framework, the paper shows the optimal tariffs of the two parties are 
different from each other. The one which chooses a high tariff hence can be named as 
Protectionism Party; and the other one which picks a low tariff is so-called Pro-trade   18
Party.  
The model can be extended in several directions. One of them is to consider the two 
parties compete in many policy instruments besides tariff. Such a scenario is closer to 
the reality at the expense of the possible failure of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Another possible extension is to give the behaviors of the uninformed group a more 
general form, though the functional form used here makes a good sense in the real 
world. Finally, it is interesting to integrate empirics into this theoretical model and 
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VIII. Appendix  
A1: Party A’s Optimal Tariff Condition in the Benchmark Case 
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where
) ( ) (
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B A
p r p r
L p T p T p w p w p CS p CS
p p K
−
− + − + −
≡ . The 
F.O.C of utility’s maximization implies ) ( ) (
A A p d p S C − = ′ , where  ) (p S C ′  is the 
derivative of consumer surplus and  ) (p d  is the import good’s consumption. Given 
the tariff revenue ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
A W A A A p m p p p m t p T − = ⋅ = , we get 
) ( ) ( ) (
A A A p m t p m p T ′ ⋅ + = ′ . Furthermore, notice that  ) (
A p d is the individual level 
of consumption of the import good, we know 2 ) ( ) ( y L p d p m
A A − = . Hence,  
) ( ) (
) (
~
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  .                 (A2) 
One can use the GDP function, K r L w y p y GDP
A + = + = 2 1 , to simplify (A2). It 
turns out  ) ( ) (





y ′ + ′ = , taking the partial derivative with respect to
A p , 
and using the Envelope theorem. Now plug it into (A2): 
0
) ( ) (
/ ) ( ) ( ] /
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L p m t p r L K K
p
p p K
 .                    (A3) 
Since  ) ( ) (
A B p r p r ≠ given that
A B p p ≠ , (A3) thus implies (10) in the paper: 
L p m











=    .                                                (A4) 
    (Q. E. D.) 
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A2: Party B’s Optimal Tariff Condition in the Benchmark Case 
  Party B chooses an optimal trade platform to maximize its vote share as well: 



















K f .With similar algebra, one obtains: 
0
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 .                    (A5) 
Simplifying, it turns out: 
L p m











= .                                      (A6) 
Again, given the assumption that L K K <
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consequently 0
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< .    
(Q.E.D.)         
                                                                  
A3: Optimal Tariff is the Nash Equilibrium 
   The vote share for Party A will decrease when Party A deviates a little from its 
optimal platform. In particular, if Party A pick up a trade platform
A t so that 
ε = −
Ao A t t , R ∈ ε , then  its vote share is less than one half: 2 1 ) , ( ) , ( = <
Bo Ao Bo A t t t t ϕ ϕ . 
In other words, 
Ao A Bo Ao Bo A t t t t t t ≠ ∀ < ), , ( ) , ( ϕ ϕ .                               (A7) 
Similarly, we have: 
Bo B Bo Ao B Ao t t t t t t ≠ ∀ − < − ), , ( 1 ) , ( 1 ϕ ϕ . 
Hence: 
Bo B Bo Ao B Ao t t t t t t ≠ ∀ > ), , ( ) , ( ϕ ϕ .                              (A8) 
Thus, the optimal trade platform pair  ) , (
Bo Ao t t is the Nash equilibrium.          (Q.E.D.)                                 21
A4:  Validity of an Assumption of Contribution Schedules 
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Given the quasi-linear utility function, it can be written below: 
∫ − + =
) , (
~
0 ) ( ] ) ( [ ) , (
B A p p K A i i i A B A A z dK K f E p CS p p C                                            (A9) 
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Taking the partial derivative with respect to
A p , one obtains (27) in the paper: 
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Re-write the second item in the RHS of (27), using similar technique show before:  
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∂
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Substituting the tariff with the median voter’s ideal point, 
L p m










= =  , 
and simplifying the second term in the RHS, one gets: 
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K i i i A dK K f K K p r 3 2 1 3 2 1     .                                  (Q. E. D.)               
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Figure 1: Model with Contribution Schedules 
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Graphs here describe a possible scenario for a model with campaign contributions. 
The bold lines denote the vote share curves for both parties with campaign 
contributions; the light lines denote the vote share curves for both parties in the 
benchmark model. Parties choose the same tariff in the benchmark case:
Bo Ao t t = . 
However, they choose different tariff level when considering contributions. Party A 
choose a high tariff (
* A t ) and party B chooses a low one (
* B t ). 